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magazines, Russian news agencies, and the Union ofJournalists of Russia. The plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant illegally copied about 500 of the plaintiffs' articles without permission.
Neither the parties nor the district court addressed the choice of law issue. Rather, they all
assumed that Russian law applied and debated exactly how Russian law dealt with the issues
before them. Plaintiffs achieved measured success (some damages and an injunction against the
defendant) in the district court. On appeal, the court of appeals asked the parties to address
the choice of law issue. In addition, to help it with this difficult and rarely covered aspect of
choice of law, the court requested Professor William Patry to submit a brief as amicus curiae.
The choice of law issue presented was which country's law applies to copyright ownership
and which applies to copyright infringement. The appellate court's analysis of the conflicts issue
began with a determination that the U.S. Act implementing the Berne Copyright Convention did
not supplant existing U.S. copyright protection, the Copyright Acts. However, that act did
not itself contain provisions relevant to the issues that were before the court. Accordingly, the
court stated that it would "fill the interstices of the Act by developing federal common law
on the conflicts issue... [and in doing so, the court is] entitled to consider and apply principles
of private international law..."16'
The court then separated the discussion of the copyright issue into the issue of copyright
ownership and copyright infringement. For the ownership issue, the court applied the usual
rule for property-that property interests are determined according to the law of the state with
the most significant relationship to the property and the parties. Finding that the works were
created by Russian nationals and first published in Russia, the court determined that Russian
law should apply and that the Berne Convention suggested nothing to the contrary.
With respect to the infringement issues, the court applied the usual rule for torts-kx ld
delii. Because the infringement occurred in the United States, the court applied U.S. law to
the infringement issues (it also remarked that to the extent a wider "interests" approach should
be considered, it would still have applied U.S. law inasmuch as the defendant was a U.S.
entity).164
The court ultimately concluded that the Russian newspapers did not, under Russian law,
have any copyright ownership in the text of the articles (although they may have had such
rights in the selection, arrangement, and display of the articles). It remanded the case for further
development with respect to the Russian authors' rights and certain other matters.
VI. Discovery
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH BORGEN*

A. INTRoDUCrION

American procedure regarding international discovery stems from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1783,
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular Rule 28(b). The leading case on the
topic of international discovery is the Supreme Court's decision in Sacit Nationak Induwtielk

163. Id. at 90.
164. See id. at 91.
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Aerospatiak v. United States Distria Court."S Many later cases base their reasoning on interpretations of Aerospatiak.
B.

DEFINING PROCEEDINGS BEFoRu FOREIGN TRImUNAIS ENTrrLED TO Am
1. Second Circuit Finds That Private Commercial Arbitrations Are Not Foreign
or International Tribunals
In NBC v. Bear Stearns 6&
Co.,"I the Second Circuit held that a private commercial arbitration
was not a "foreign or international tribunal" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1782. At issue was
whether section 1782 empowered U.S. courts to compel third parties not bound by the arbitration contract in question to respond to subpoenas issued in relation to the arbitration. The
Second Circuit began by noting that "foreign or international tribunals" is undefined in the
'
statute, and thus "is to be given its plain or natural meaning."167
Although finding the term's
plain meaning to be broad enough to include both state-sponsored and private tribunals, the
court concluded that reference to the statute's context was necessary to determine Congress'
intent.'"" Reviewing the legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that the term "tribunals" was only meant to refer to conventional courts, intergovernmental arbitral tribunals, and
other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies. 6 ' Moreover, construing section 1782 to include
private commercial arbitrations would be "in stark contrast" to the limited evidence gathering
capabilities of domestic arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration Act, would undermine the
efficiency and cost effectiveness of international arbitration, and "thus arguably conflict with
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution
... [and] would create an entirely new category of disputes concerning the appointment of
arbitrators and the characterization of arbitral panels as domestic, foreign, or international."' 70

2. Second Circuit Parses Definition of Foreign Tribunal
In Euromaepa S.A. v. Emerian,'7 ' the Second Circuit found that neither a pending French
bankruptcy proceeding following a final judgment by the French Supreme Court, nor a potential
motion to reopen the judgment of the French Court of Appeal, met section 1782's requirement
that the discovery sought be for use in a "foreign tribunal." As in prior such decisions, the
Second Circuit focused its analysis "on two questions: (1) whether a foreign proceeding is
adjudicative in nature; and (2) when there is actually a foreign proceeding.""' The Euromepa
court reasoned that, while there may be bankruptcy proceedings that constitute adjudicative
proceedings for the purpose of section 1782,7'3 in the instant case the merits had already been
adjudicated and the bankruptcy proceeding existed merely to enforce a pre-existing judgment,
17
and thus was not adjudicative. 4
Regarding the issue ofwhether there is actually a foreign proceeding-the issue ofpendencythe Second Circuit found that "a proceeding need not actually be pending, but rather that a
165. Soci&ti Nationale Industielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).

166. NBC v. Bear Steams & Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1999).
167. NBC, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 at *It.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Seid at *12-*13.
Seeid at *14-*20.
Id at *22 (citations omitted).
Euromepa S.A. v. Esmerian, 154 F.3d. 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 27.
Se id at 28, citing Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
See In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
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proceeding must be 'imminent-very likely to occur and very soon to occur.' " The Euromepa
court concluded that the argument that discovery could be used regarding a potential reopening
of the case was "meritless," since "Section 1782 is designed to provide discovery in aid of
foreign litigation, not to provide discovery to justify the reopening of already completed foreign
litigation.''17
C. DiscovERY FOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIEUNALS

1.Third Circuit Does Not Find a Discoverabiity Requirement in Ordering Discovery Related to a
Proceeding Before a Foreign Tribunal
In In re Bayer AG, 77 the Third Circuit held that a petitioner for discovery under section
1782 did not need first to seek a ruling from a foreign tribunal on whether the discovery was
permissible. The district court had denied Bayer's application for discovery because Bayer had
not first obtained a ruling from the judge in the underlying Spanish proceeding as to whether
the requested information was relevant. Reviewing the Third Circuit's previous decision in
Jobn Deere Ltd v. Sperry Corp., 71 the Bayer court stated that the Jobn Deere court "held that
neither reciprocity nor admissibility were controlling concerns under § 1782(a).'1 79 If Congress
had chosen to include a requirement of discoverability, it would have done so explicitly.
Importantly, the Bayer court found that granting discovery where it would not be available
ina foreign jurisdiction would not lead other nations to perceive the United States as holding
their laws in contempt.'° In addressing the argument that Bayer could have gone to the Spanish
court first in its attempt to obtain discovery, the Third Circuit stated that this would impose
a " 'quasi-exhaustion requirement' [that] ...has been rejected by those courts that have
addressed it."1'
2. Soutern District of New York Clarifies Proceduresof InternationalJudiaal Assistance
In two decisions in In re Letters Rogatory from Caracas, Venezuela, S.A., Concerning Cecilia
Matos," 2 a New York federal court considered various issues related to international judicial
assistance in response to letters rogatory. The letters were issued by a Venezuelan court asking
the U.S. Department of Justice to gather certain evidence regarding Carlos Andres Perez and
Cecilia Matos, his alleged common-law wife. The district court, on petition from the Department
of Justice, appointed a commissioner to oversee the gathering of evidence. The commissioner
subpoenaed Matos to testify, and Matos moved to quash.
175. Euromepa, 154 F.3dat 27, quoting In re IntemationalJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) ofthe Federative
Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
176. Id at 29.
177. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998).
178. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
179. Bayer, 146 F.3d at 192. The Bayer court found the application of lon Deere by the district court for
the proposition that there is a discoverability requirement "understandable" because at least two previous courts
of appeal had come to similar conclusions. See In re Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1,6 (1st Cir. 1992); In re
Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir.
1988). The court noted, however, that "(i]n contrast, the Second Circuit read Joln Deere as we do ...[t]hat
court said insightfully 'lohnDe is not a case about whether section 1782 requires discoverability, and the court
never explicitly states such a requirement exists.' " Bayer, 146 F.3d at 192 citing In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d
54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
180. Bayer, 146 F.3d at 194.
181. Id at 195-96, citing In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
182. In re Letters Rogatory, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 14, 1998) and 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2755 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 11, 1998).
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Finding that the letters could not fairly be read to include the Matos subpoena, the court
quashed the subpoena, stating that "the scope of the commissioner's authority to gather evidence
must be found in the text of the [letters rogatory] or it cannot be found at all.''. Furthermore,
the court found it unlikely that a Venezuelan court would order such a deposition in light of
the Venezuelan constitutional protections regarding self-incrimination and spousal privileges.
In the second decision,'" the .court denied Matos' motion to bar transmission of a transcript
of a deposition of a non-party that had been conducted not only by the commissioner, but
by a member of the Venezuelan consulate as well. According to Matos, the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory forbade consular officials from performing acts involving
compulsion, and the questioning of the deponent by the consular official constituted the unlicensed practice of law. The court stated that it was doubtful that either Matos or the non-party
deponent had standing to claim a violation of the treaty, as the treaty "creates rights in the
signatory states, not in any individual or group."'' Moreover, the court believed the facts did
not support the contention that the consular official used compulsion in any way as he merely
posed questions, and where the deponent was directed to answer, the direction came from
the commissioner. In any case, the court found that the treaty provides that consular or
diplomatic agents may take evidence and obtain information, and that under the Supremacy
186
Clause, the treaty provision superseded any licensing requirement under New York law.
3. Pntikge Under Hague Evidence Convention
At issue in In re Letters Rogatory from the Local Court of Plon, Germany"' was whether the
respondent could be compelled by a Michigan federal court to produce a blood sample to
establish paternity upon request made by the Local Court of Plon, Germany in a letter rogatory
where Michigan law would not require such a blood sample under the circumstances. The
court assessed whether article 11 of the Hague Convention' s was implicated by the Michigan
law. The court agreed with the government that "[t]he fact that Michigan courts would not
require a putative father to produce blood samples, once he acknowledges paternity, does not
prove that such a test be precluded."'' Simply stating that a blood sample would not be
required under Michigan law did not constitute a privilege or duty to refuse.
D. DiscovEtv

FOR PROCEEDINGS BEOioR U.S. CourTs

1. Trial Court Addresses Use of Hague Convention Before New York State Courts
In Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubisbi, Ltd. v. Kvaernera.s.,'90 a New York state trial court considered the
relationship of the Hague Convention to state discovery rules and, echoing federal jurisprudence,
found that "Hague Convention procedures are not required so long as the discovery takes

183. Id at "6.
184. See id
185. Id at *3.
186. See id. at *5, citing Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, arts. 2 and 13.
187. In re Letters Rogatory, 29 F. Supp. 2d 776, 1998 WL 884465 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 1998).
188. Stating, "[i]n the execution of a letter of request, the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so
far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give evidence... (a) under the law of the State ofexecution..." Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, art. 11, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
189. Lern Rogatmy, 1998 WL 884465 at *3 (internal quotation omitted).
190. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. v. Kvaemer a.s., 175 Misc.2d 408, 671 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. Jan. 15, 1998).
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place within the United States and is in no way offensive to the principles of international
comity."191

2. Second Circuit Finds Broad Ability to Serve Partnersbipsand No Mandatory Primacy of
Hague Convention in Document Discovery
This past year there were a series of decisions in relation to First American Corporationv.
Price Waterhouse LLP, of which two are of particular note as concerns discovery of foreign
non-parties through subpoenas under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.
On appeal in FirstAmerican Corp. v. Price Waterbouse LLP,"' the Second Circuit found that
under New York law, a document subpoena can be served on a non-New York partnership
by personal process on any partner who happens to be within New York: "If valid service is
effected on any partner within the state, personal jurisdiction over the partnership isachieved."' 93
Regarding whether a British court should first decide on the propriety of the requested disclosure,
the Second Circuit was not persuaded by arguments that First American should be compelled
to resort first to the Hague Convention in relation to demands of non-party witnesses. The
Second Circuit found comity analysis to be more applicable, and it also found that the district
court had done what comity requires in using the Minpeco factors to gauge the reasonableness
of the discovery request, 94 If the British courts prohibited Price Waterhouse U.K. from disclosing
the subpoenaed documents, the company could seek exemption from sanctions under Rule
37. g' Finally, the Second Circuit concluded that the Hague Convention did not offer "a
meaningful avenue ofdiscovery in the present case" since the U.K. only permits pretrial discovery
96
if each document sought is separately described, which would not be possible in this case.
3. Wbere Depositions of Foreign Persons May Be Held
Shortly after the Second Circuit ruling, the district court in First American turned to 97a
subpoena that purported to command depositions of London-based witnesses in New York.'
The foreign non-party argued that Rule 45 forbade compelling a witness to travel more than
100 miles from the place where that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business
in person to testify as a non-party in a deposition and that enforcement of the subpoena would
violate international comity. The court concluded that the fact that the foreign non-party did
business in New York through an agent was insufficient to permit a deposition in New York;
" 'the place' where [Price Waterhouse U.K.] and its partners and employees 'reside,' are
'employed,' or 'regularly transact[s] business in person' is not New York.""' If, however, the
deposition were to be conducted in England, the subpoena could not be issued from New
York, as Rule 45 contemplated that the subpoena issue from the district in which the witness
was and that district be no more than 100 miles from that witness's residence, employ, or
place in which he or she regularly transacts business.
191. Id. at 410, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 904, citing Wilson v. Lufthansa 108 A.D.2d 393, 397, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575.

192. First Am. Corp. v.Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998).
193. Id. at 19.
194. The Minpeco factors are: (i) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict; (ii)the
hardship that compliance would impose on the party or witness from whom discovery issought; (iii) the importance
to the litigation of the information and documents requested; and (iv)the good faith of the party resisting discovery.
Id. at 22, citing Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodiry Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
195. See FirstAm. Corp., 154 F.3d at 22.
196. Id. at23.
197. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 474196 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,1998).
198. See id at*6.
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In Tripk Crown America, Inc. v. Biosymnb AG," 9' a Pennsylvania federal court considered
whether Biosynth AG, a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Staad,
Switzerland, could be ordered to appear for depositions in that district. The court noted that
Swiss law places substantial restrictions on the conduct of discovery.2" Biosynth AG argued
for reliance on the Hague Convention, and that Swiss authorities may allow depositions in
Switzerland for use in a U.S. lawsuit, but provided no details as to the procedures or how
long they might take. The court stated that "It]he burden of demonstrating that use of the
Convention procedures would provide effective discovery is on the proponent of using such
procedures. ' 2"0 The court concluded that depositions in Switzerland would "entail substantial
time, effort, expense and dday, and would not effectively facilitate the gathering of evidence
in a manner contemplated by the Federal Rules." 2 2 Consequently, plaintiff could depose Biosynth AG in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, although plaintiff would be required to
reimburse defendant for reasonable travel and lodging costs and the depositions were to be
scheduled to minimize disruption to the operation of Biosynth AG.2°"
Ex Parte Toyokuni & Co., Ltd.2 4 concerned a suit against a kerosene heater manufacturer
over a death allegedly caused by a faulty heater. The administrator of the estate of the deceased
sought to depose representatives of defendant Toyokuni, a Japanese corporation that had no
offices in Alabama or the United States. The Alabama Supreme Court found that since the
plaintiff had made an attempt to suggest a mutually convenient mid-point for the depositions,
such as Los Angeles, but Toyokuni rejected the suggestion, the circuit court had not abused
to Toyokuni's
its discretion in ordering the depositions to take place in Alabama, as opposed
'
offices in Japan, as it was "[flaced with Toyokuni's lack of cooperation." 'f
The Alabama Supreme Court did not view Japan as a viable venue for the depositions due
to its strict discovery procedures, especially since "Toyokuni would have access to our more
open discovery methods.""2 6 Moreover, the court perceived a U.S. interest in having the
depositions in Alabama to resolve any discovery conflicts and "in maintaining the integrity of
nation over persons
our judicial system and in exercising the jurisdiction of this state and this
' 207
whose products are distributed in the United States and in Alabama.
VII. Personal Jurisdiction
SHELBY

R.

QUAST*

The U.S. courts continued to refine the legal principles governing when they may properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over cases involving foreign parties and events. Notable developments in 1998 focused on jurisdiction over intentional torts by foreign parties and applicable
burden of proof.

199.
200.
201.
202.

Triple Crown Am., Inc. v. Biosynth AG, 1998 WL 227886 (E.D. Pa Apr. 30, 1998).
See id. at *3
See id (citations omitted).
See id at *4.

203. See id
204. Ex Pate Toyokuni & Co., Ltd., 715 So.2d 786 (Ala. S. Ct 1998).
205. See d at789.
206. Sm id
207. See id at 789-90.
*Shelby R. Quast is an associate with Wilmer, Cuder & Pickering in Washington, D.C.
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